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CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY, THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE
SPEECH, AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS*
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The theory of free speech is a natural subject of interdisciplinary
and comparative study for both political philosophers and lawyers.
First, it has a highly abstract component, in which issues of general
normative philosophy are at stake (for example, competing
arguments of utilitarian or perfectionist teleological consequentialism
versus those of deontological natural rights); second, it has an
historical and contextual component, in which free speech is
embedded in an historically evolving tradition of constitutional
thought, including both political and legal arguments made over time
about its proper meaning. The proper balance between these two
components (political theory and interpretive history) differs in
various legal systems, all of which are committed in some form to free
speech. Nations with written constitutions and judicial review (the
United States, Canada, Germany, and the nations governed by the
European Convention of Human Rights) give greater play to abstract
normative argument than a nation like the United Kingdom, in which
free speech is a principle of common law in light of which supreme
parliamentary law is interpreted;1 and those nations with long
traditions of judicial review under written constitutions with highly
abstract language (like the United States) refer more often to both
abstract arguments of political theory and the long history of their
interpretive experience than nations (such as Germany) with
relatively recent post-World War II written constitutions (with U.S.-
* Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University. © David A.J. Richards 1999.
The argument of this article is extensively developed in DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH
AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY (forthcoming 1999).
1. For a good treatment of this question, with specific focus on the British law of free
speech, see ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1985). In addition to its own common law
of free speech, the United Kingdom is a signatory to the European Convention for Human
Rights and, to the extent required by the Convention, is governed by its written guarantees and
interpretive institutions. See generally MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (1995).
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style judicial review) in which guarantees have been drafted in
somewhat more specific terms.2 The two components of the study of
free speech will accordingly interact in different ways depending on
such distinctions. For example, the normative theory of utilitarianism
may naturally fit the British constitutional landscape of free speech,
while a deontological theory of rights may be the better account of
both American and German constitutionalism. However, even
systems (like Germany and the United States) that appeal to a
comparable rights-based deontological theory and judicial review
may, as we shall see, quite differently interpret such theory in ways
that bear directly on central issues of free speech (for example, the
constitutionality of group libel laws).
This article addresses both components of the theory of free
speech from an American constitutional perspective on these issues.
In the course of my argument, I thus state and criticize several general
normative theories of free speech (namely, utilitarian and
perfectionist consequentialism and the argument from democracy),
and then present a third view (free speech as toleration) and discuss
its substantial merits both as a political theory and as an account of
America's historically continuous interpretive experience. I bring the
force of my argument into sharper focus in the form of a defense of
one of American constitutionalism's quite distinctive views (namely,
that the principle of free speech renders group libel laws
problematic).
My account is by no means defensive of all current American
judicially enforceable views of principles of free speech, but it is
concerned to defend certain of them both against the different views
taken in other nations (committed as well to principles of free speech)
and, in particular, against recent American doubts expressed usually
from the political left. These doubts take the following form: tensions
between American principles of free speech (as currently understood)
and principles condemning the political expression of irrational
prejudice (racism, sexism, and homophobia). In particular, current
constitutional skepticism about laws protecting groups from
communicative insults to their group identity illegitimately advances
2. For example, Article 5 of the German Basic Law textually distinguishes freedom of
speech and of the press (in Article 5(1)) from freedom of art, research, and teaching (in Article
5(3)), imposing specific textual limitations on the former (in Article 5(2)) but no such
limitations on the latter. See BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 7 (1987).
In contrast, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides a general
guarantee of the right to freedom of expression (in Article 10(1)), subject to general restrictions
applicable to this right in general (in Article 10(2)). See JANIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 471.
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irrational prejudice for reasons of free speech that are without merit.3
Indeed, in one form of the argument, the very integrity of principles
of antidiscrimination is said to require the constitutionality of group
libel laws, because these principles themselves condemn, for example,
state-sponsored apartheid as a form of constitutionally unjust group
libel.'
Responses to these claims usually argue from the perspective of
defensible principles of free speech.' I agree with many of these
arguments and will support many of them in the work that follows.
But such arguments can only be appreciated in their full and proper
force if they are integrated structurally with a larger understanding of
their important place and role in the understanding of
antidiscrimination principles themselves. The interest of the recent
doubts about the current state of American law in free speech is that
its proponents argue from the perspective of advancing the purposes
of antidiscrimination principles. We should not underestimate the
dimensions that this challenge represents to a reasonable interpretive
consensus that had been painfully achieved through the experience of
the common grounds in the struggle for respect for civil liberties and
against racism, a consensus brilliantly stated as a precious doctrinal
legacy to posterity by Harry Kalven, Jr.6 If the challenge is to be met,
it must be met in the terms of the consensus it challenges, which is as
much an interpretive issue of principle about the evil of racism (and
sexism and homophobia) as an issue of free speech. The argument of
this article arises as much from a concern about compromising
principles of antidiscrimination as principles of free speech. The
questions, if I am right, are structurally connected.
The problem in free speech theory arises, I believe, from the
uncritical allegiance of recent academic free speech theory to the
argument from democracy.' On this view, both the purposes and
3. For a useful compendium of such recent arguments, see MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL.,
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993) [hereinafter WORDS THAT WOUND]. See also FREEING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (David S. Allen &
Robert Jensen eds., 1995)
4. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 3, at 53.
5. For a compendium of such arguments, see HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., ET AL.,
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1994) [hereinafter SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX].
6. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
7. For three recent notable examples, see OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH
(1996) [hereinafter FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH]; OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) [hereinafter FISS,
1999]
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scope of free speech must be understood as in service of political
democracy. It is from this vantage point that neither restrictions on
group libel nor those on campaign expenditures are regarded as
raising free speech issues. The inference runs as follows: free speech
advances democracy; group libel or campaign finance laws advance
democracy; therefore, group libel and campaign finance laws do not
raise free speech issues. Now, it must be obvious that much of the
argument here rides on what counts as democracy, a contestable
concept if there ever was one; for example, the argument for
democracy can, depending on your view of democracy, be as plausibly
used against as for the constitutionality of campaign finance laws. In
order to understand the implications of the theory for free speech,
much will turn on how richly or thinly the concept is parsed. One area
of ongoing controversy (free speech) is thus analyzed in terms of
another area (democracy) that is even more controversial, a feature
of the argument from democracy that does not bode well for its
critical power as an account of the legitimate role principles of free
speech must play in limiting the scope of democratic politics. Where a
good theory of free speech would underscore the tension between
free speech and democracy, this theory eliminates the tension without
any sense of loss. If the argument from democracy is as inadequate an
account of the principle of free speech, as I argue it is, we will have to
take seriously, in a way the argument from democracy does not, the
independent values served by free speech, against which the
legitimacy of democratic politics must be assessed.
We will also have to take seriously something the argument from
democracy does not, namely, cumulative American historical
experience about the important role free speech has played in
addressing the most fundamental injustices of American
constitutional democracy, including the structural injustice underlying
American racism, sexism, and homophobia. To do so, we must
investigate, as central to the proper understanding of the value and
weight of free speech, its connections to the theory of
antidiscrimination. Just as we interrogate a theory of free speech that
drains it of its critical normative power, we question as well an
associated theory of our principles of antidiscrimination that fails to
address both the nature of and appropriate remedies for the
underlying constitutional evil-what I call the structural injustice of




moral slavery. I have argued at length elsewhere8 that such structural
injustice involves two features: first, the abridgment of the basic
human rights of a group of persons; and second, its unjustly circular
rationalization in terms of dehumanizing stereotypes sustained by
such abridgment (including attempts to suppress criticism of such
structural injustice by its privatization, as not properly speakable or
even unspeakable and therefore unthinkable). 9 Our constitutional
principles of antidiscrimination condemn the expression through law
of prejudices arising from such structural injustice.
I link the questions of free speech and antidiscrimination both in
the way I explicate the constitutional evil of discriminatory prejudice
and address, on that basis, the question of remedy. The evil of
discriminatory prejudice is its insult to identity on constitutionally
inadequate, suspect grounds. In particular, such prejudices enforce
dehumanizing stereotypes of race (racism), gender (sexism), or
gendered sexuality (homophobia) as the stigmatized terms of one's
identity as an African-American, woman, or gay or lesbian. I have
thus argued that the construction of such structural injustice crucially
turns on the abridgment of basic human rights to the stigmatized
group, in particular, basic human rights of conscience, speech,
intimate life, and work. The abridgments of conscience and speech
play an especially pivotal role because they eliminate the voices and
views that most reasonably might protest the unjust terms of identity
imposed on them. On this view, abridgment of free speech is an
important feature of the background structure of discriminatory
prejudice.
In terms of this background, I believe we must understand the
affirmative role guarantees of human rights in general, and rights of
conscience and speech in particular, play as constitutionally
reasonable remedies for such an evil (namely, stereotypical
dehumanization). Group libel laws are, from this perspective,
constitutionally problematic because they enlist the state at exactly
the wrong point, enforcing its judgments of stereotypical harm in
ways that replicate and do not deconstruct the underlying cultural
evil. In each area (racism, sexism, homophobia), the stereotypical
8. For my earlier studies of this question, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND
THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
(1993) [hereinafter RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION]; and DAVID A.J.
RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND
GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW (1998) [hereinafter RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION].
9. See RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 368.
1999]
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evils in question can only be responsibly addressed in the domain of
conviction by the voice and outlook of protesting individuals who
self-organize in their own terms to protest such evils in what I call the
politics of identity. I understand such politics broadly to include not
only political action and protest of the conventional sort, but the
manifold forms of cultural politics that include forging new cultural
narratives that more responsibly do justice to the lives and experience
of persons who have suffered from and struggled against structural
injustice. It is only such cultural politics, conducted on the responsible
terms of principle required by the principle of free speech, that can, in
my judgment, reasonably remedy the immense cultural evils inflicted
by patterns of structural injustice. In this domain, the interposition of
state judgments keyed to alleged group harms from speech not only
fails responsibly to address the evil, but worsens it.
The interest of this account of the principle of free speech is, in
contrast to others, its linkage of the principle to protest against the
terms of structural injustice. Free speech, on the account I offer of it,
is based on the inalienable right to conscience also protected by the
religion clauses of the First Amendment, and takes on special force in
making space for conscientious convictions that protest fundamental
injustice, including protest of constitutional institutions themselves. A
theory of this sort has a certain reasonable scope and force, but it
applies only within its own terms. It thus addresses and condemns
blatant forms of state censorship in the domain of conviction, but it
does not apply to or limit reasonable state concerns for evils outside
this domain. For example, it does not condemn reasonable legislative
attempts to regulate expenditures in political campaigns in order to
advance constitutionally legitimate goals of political equality.10 It is
one of the unacceptable consequences of the uncritical dominance of
the argument for democracy in thought about free speech that the
constitutionality of such legislation has been assessed in terms of it.
Usually, such assessment has been fatal to such legislation on the
ground that it unconstitutionally interposes the state in the
constitutionally protected area of political speech; more recently,
forms of the same argument have been urged (somewhat
paradoxically) in support of the constitutionality of such legislation.
We need to transcend the terms in which this important issue has
been unfortunately cast. The argument I offer here gives a way of
thinking about this issue that suggests current American judicial
10. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 215-19 (1986).
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treatment of this and related matters, as an issue of free speech
principle, is uncritically wrong.
As I earlier observed, the theory of free speech has both an
abstract component of political theory and an historical and
contextual component, in which free speech is embedded in an
historically evolving tradition of constitutional thought. An American
constitutional perspective on free speech brings these components
into relationship in an historically evolving tradition of constitutional
interpretation of a written Constitution enduring over two hundred
years, including both political and legal arguments made over time
about its proper meaning. Contemporary American constitutional
interpretation ascribes meaning to written texts that are often highly
abstract (for example, "freedom of speech" in the First Amendment)
reflecting and revising background historical understandings of
Lockean political theory of the conditions on legitimate government,
including respect for the inalienable human right of conscience and
other basic rights. The interpretation of such abstract texts draws
upon not only the background history and political theory at the time
of their ratification, but also the interpretive practice (of both judicial
and political argument) of those texts, including significant
amendments thereto, over time. The Constitution of 1787, as
amended by the Bill of Rights of 1791, largely imposed guarantees of
basic human rights only on the federal government, leaving state
power to constitutional scrutiny largely under applicable state
constitutional guarantees of human rights. 1 In the wake of the Civil
War, various principles of the Reconstruction Amendments extended
national guarantees of basic human rights to both the states and to
the national government. 12 But the understanding of what those basic
rights were and how they should be understood, even after the
Reconstruction Amendments, has changed over time, sometimes
quite dramatically. A good theory of constitutional interpretation
must integrate all these elements (text, history, political theory,
interpretive practice), including an informative understanding of how
and why basic constitutional principles have been differently
contextualized over time. Presumably, a theory of constitutional
interpretation will be a better one to the extent it both explains more
of the interpretive domain (including the relations among basic
11. See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
ALISM (1989).
12. See generally RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8.
1999]
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constitutional values) and also, when there is intractable interpretive
conflict, affords reasonable normative criteria in terms of which such
conflicts may be assessed. Any good constitutional theory must thus
be both explanatory and normative.
The motivation for the theory of free speech here proposed is
better to meet such criteria than competitor theories both as a theory
of free speech and of the structural connections of free speech to
other constitutional principles of values. I have elsewhere argued that
free speech, on the theory I offer of it, offers unifying principles,
based on the argument for toleration, that explain and integrate basic
constitutional rights of conscience, speech, and intimate life.'3 I
extend that argument here to elaborate the argument for toleration,
central to my understanding of free speech, to explain as well the role
free speech plays in identifying and debunking the structural injustice
of moral slavery condemned by various principles of the
Reconstruction Amendments. A constitutional theory surely better
meets appropriate methodological criteria of adequacy when it both
illuminates the structure of each constitutional value (for example,
free speech, or religious liberty, or equal protection) and, at the same
time, explains how each such value structurally relates to underlying
common conceptions and principles.
If the ambition of constitutional theory is so general, why free
speech? Certainly, in the long perspective of American constitutional
history, free speech only began to enjoy serious federal judicial
enforcement in the twentieth century and, even then, largely after
World War II. Such increasingly aggressive judicial enforcement itself
requires interpretive explication both as a commentary on our
contemporary sense of basic constitutional principles and on our
sense of normative deficits in our constitutional tradition with
consequences we self-consciously want not to repeat. An historically
self-conscious theory of American constitutional interpretation must
thus address earlier interpretive mistakes, examining with care the
larger consequences of such mistakes for related constitutional
principles. For example, the failure to extend respect for basic rights
of free speech to abolitionist advocacy in the antebellum period, on
terms of principle, uncritically enforced the hold of both American
slavery and racism on the American public mind at the intolerable
sacrifice of basic constitutional values of respect for universal human
rights, sowing the seeds of the Second American Revolution, the Civil
13. See generally RICHARDS, supra note 10.
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War.14 The value we place on free speech is and must be informed by
an interpretive mistake of such tragic dimensions, which cannot be of
interest only to Americans but must engage the reasonable attention
of any people that frames its constitutional identity in terms of
respect for basic human rights. No constitutional tradition, including
that of the United States, can be regarded as uniformly progressive or
enlightened. Indeed, a theory of basic constitutional values of human
rights will surely be a better critical guide to the extent it helps us
understand today how disastrous mistaken interpretations of human
rights have been in our constitutional tradition and how self-blinding
they have been in our betrayals of the most fundamental principles of
constitutional government.
I focus here on free speech because the growing federal judicial
protection of its principle in the twentieth century has, in my
judgment, been the interpretive model that has guided and framed
the interpretation of related constitutional principles (including
principles of religious liberty, constitutional privacy, and equal
protection). The answer to "Why free speech?" is thus importantly
set by our contemporary self-understanding of the legitimate agenda
of judicially enforceable constitutional principles. It is a datum of our
interpretive practices that the judicial protection of free speech has
played such a role as a model for the protection of related
constitutional principles, and it is therefore a reasonable interpretive
demand on constitutional theory that it explain "Why free speech?"
Of course, any interpretive practice may be challenged, and it is
not an acceptable answer to appeal, positivistically, to a practice as
self-validating. It is at this point that the historical and contextual
component of a theory of free speech must engage with its abstract
component of political theory. The question "Why free speech?" is a
free standing question of normative political theory that engages
philosophical interest in political justice whether or not those claims
of justice are embodied in constitutional law. But if those claims are
embodied in constitutional law, as they are under American
constitutionalism, such normative political theory plays a crucial role
in our interpretive understanding of the normative basis, if there is
one, for the priority accorded free speech in the historically evolving
American interpretive practice.
14. See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 15, 21, 109,
110, 116-18, 121,134, 136-37, 144.
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I. FREE SPEECH AND THE ARGUMENT FOR TOLERATION
Why free speech? I address this question of the priority of free
speech here from the perspective of normative political theory. On
the basis of a criticism of several alternative views, I present a more
defensible view, one based on the argument for toleration.
A. Utilitarian Models of Free Speech
Utilitarian models of free speech take a wide variety of forms,
such as John Stuart Mill's classically complex and nuanced arguments
in On Liberty" to Oliver Wendell Holmes's crude appeal to the
amoral deliverances of Social Darwinian competition in his dissent in
Abrams v. United States.16 The abstract structure of these arguments is
that protection of free speech is justified because over all (its
tendency to advance truth and the like) it promotes the greatest net
balance of pleasure over pain among all sentient beings. But such
arguments will not justify principles of free speech of the sort that
American constitutional law now requires. The net aggregate of
pleasure over pain is often advanced, not frustrated, by the restriction
of speech. Large populist majorities often relish (hedonically
speaking) the repression of outcast dissenters-the numbers and
pains of dissenters are by comparison small-and there is often no
offsetting future net aggregate of pain over pleasure to make up the
difference. Holmes's more skeptical and less humane utilitarian vision
may therefore reflect a sounder balancing of the competing utilitarian
consequences than Mill's. For Holmes, free speech values should
protect only those "puny anonymities"17 unlikely to harm anyone and
from whom something might be learned; they would not protect a
more politically effective speaker (like the challenge of a Eugene
Debs to American involvement in World War I or comparable
dissenters to the Vietnam War later) whose threat to existing
institutions and policies was clear and whose benefit to those
institutions and policies was unclear. 18 But that approach is decidedly
15. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-74 (Alburey Castell ed., 1947) (1859).
16. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. This interpretation of Holmes's views on free speech is not inconsistent with the rather
more expansive language of his dissent in Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."), if that language is to be
contextually understood in terms of the protection of a political group of fringe left-wing
[Vol. 74:779
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not the current approach to free speech protection in American
constitutional law, and rightly so.19 The credible critical challenge to
American war policies in both cases was precisely the dissenting
speech most worthy of protection. Otherwise, free speech protection
would be extended only to the incredible fatuities of the lunatic
fringe.
B. Perfectionist Models of Free Speech
For reasons already suggested, John Stuart Mill's liberal theory
of free speech and private life seems to many more normatively
powerful than the utilitarian grounds he urges in support of it. In
particular, nothing in the structure of utilitarian argument (which
gives equal weight to all pleasures and pains) can reasonably explain
the normative priority Mill, like most liberals, accords speech. Mill's
conclusions seem sounder than his normative premises, which
suggests that his premises should be reformulated in some way more
likely to lead to supporting his conclusions.20
One appealing solution along these lines is to retain the
teleological character of utilitarianism as a kind of moral theory but
to revise the conception of what is aggregated. Utilitarianism is a
form of teleological moral theory: right conduct is defined as the
aggregate of goods or evils, where goods are understood as pleasures
and evils as pains. Such a proposed alternative form of teleological
moral theory is perfectionism: right conduct is defined as the
aggregate of goods or evils, but goods are now defined as human
excellences and evils as human degradations. The liberal normative
appeal of such a conception is better to understand the kind of
normative weight Mill accords speech as a higher pleasure, thus
entitled, in his conception, to a greater utilitarian weight over lower
pleasures.21 Such a conception hardly coheres well with what many,
including Mill, claimed to find normatively appealing in utilitarianism
as a moral theory: its equal weighting of pleasures or pains as such
(whatever their sources).22 If, from this perspective, "everybody to
socialists whom Holmes regarded as, in contrast to Debs, politically impotent.
19. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (anti-draft speech, including
threats to kill President Johnson, held constitutionally protected); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116
(1966) (speech of Julian Bond protesting Vietnam War held constitutionally protected).
20. See, e.g., C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY (1980).
21. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 9-33 (Oskar Piest ed., 1957) (1861).
22. See id. at 76-78.
1999]
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count for one, nobody for more than one,' 23 presumably the pleasure
of speech for one should be no greater than that of a good meal for
another (at least hedonically understood); and there seems no natural
way to accord speech the kind of priority over other values that
liberal political theories, including Mill's, mean to accord it.
Perfectionism, however, has no difficulties in claiming that
certain activities are more excellent or worthy than others. It precisely
resists what it takes to be the philistinism of utilitarian normative
theory, insisting that certain activities (involving our higher human
faculties, like speech) are more excellent and thus more worthy to be
pursued, whether they yield aggregate pleasure or not over all. We
have then a teleological normative theory that can give us the
normative priority of free speech that we are looking for, one that
better explains and justifies Mill's liberal principles of free speech and
personal autonomy.
The problem, however, is that any form of perfectionism,
understood as an ultimate foundation of normative theory, takes as
its starting point interpretations of excellences in living that threaten
to be highly personal or even sectarian, imposing controversial values
in violation of the liberal imperative of equal concern and respect. To
this extent, perfectionism is an insecure basis for a liberal political
theory. On perfectionist grounds alone, there seems little way to
choose between more liberal interpretations of such premises (as by
Haksar 4 and Raz2E) and illiberal interpretations (Finnis26 and
George21). Finnis thus condemns as moral evils abortion,
contraception, and consensual homosexuality not in terms of
reasonable arguments accessible to all but in terms of sectarian
arguments internal to a certain version of Catholic moral theology.28
If Finnis is wrong about the reasonable force of his arguments for
those outside his religious tradition (as he clearly is), how can we be
sure that any perfectionist litany of foundationally ultimate
perfectionist goods and evils is not similarly either confused or
23. Id. at 76.
24. See VINIT HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY, AND PERFECTIONISM (1979).
25. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
26. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
27. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY (1993).
28. See David A.J. Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle: A Reply to John
Finnis, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1987); David A.J. Richards, Perfectionist Moral Theory, the




question-begging in ways that threaten the most basic values of the
liberal state? If we want to do better justice to Mill's liberalism, we
must seek elsewhere for a more secure foundation for the priority of
free speech in constitutional democracy.
C. The Argument from Democracy
In light of the controversies among substantive normative
political theories already discussed, one appealing move is to look
away from substantive political theory entirely and seek salvation in
democratic political processes. The political process model of free
speech conceives the core function of such speech to be the
protection of the democratic political process from the abusive
censorship of political debate by the transient majority who has
democratically achieved political power.29 In the form of this view
offered by John Hart Ely, the appeal of the theory is its forthright
response to the democratic objection to judicial review.30 On this
model, judicial review on free speech grounds does not run afoul of
the democratic objection to judicial review; judicial review here
protects the integrity of democracy itself from the illegitimate attempt
of a transient majority to entrench its own power by manipulating the
agenda of political debate in its own favor. The judiciary does not, on
Ely's view, illegitimately impose on democratic majorities a
substantive value, but legitimately insists upon and monitors a view of
democratic procedural fairness. 31
The very coherence of this approach to free speech protection
requires a background conception of democratic legitimacy, i.e.,
forms of political power that democratic majorities may and may not
legitimately exercise. But the idea of democracy is essentially
contestable; views differ as to what is and what is not essential to a
well-functioning democracy or, conversely, what counts as democratic
"pathology" for purposes of determining the legitimate scope of free
speech.32 For example, recent proponents of the argument from
29. For an early influential statement of this view, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1948).
30. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
73-104 (1980).
31. See id.
32. For a range of perspectives on the democratic pathologies that free speech should
remedy, see FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 7, at 9-46; and Vincent Blasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
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democracy (Cass Sunstein 3  and Owen Fiss34) claim that it shows,
among other things, that regulations of campaign financing should not
raise free speech issues, on the ground that such regulations better
insure a well-functioning and properly responsive political
democracy. 35 I agree that such regulations should not be regarded as
violating free speech principles but fail to see how such a result can be
forthrightly squared with the argument from democracy. Indeed, it
was the very force of the argument from democracy in the thinking of
the Supreme Court that led it, I believe, to take the view in Buckley v.
Valeo,36 which Sunstein, Fiss, and I criticize, namely, that restrictions
on campaign expenditures violate free speech. Within the framework
of the argument from democracy, the Court's reasoning is at least as
plausible as its democratic critics, indeed perhaps more so. On one
plausible interpretation, the argument from democracy construes
political speech to be core protected speech, in particular, protected
from infringement by politicians trying to self-entrench their political
power. But, restrictions on campaign expenditures can plausibly be
regarded as falling in this domain: attempts to interfere with
resources closely related to political speech in ways that favor the
political interests of politicians in retaining or gaining power. It was
an uncritical commitment to the argument from democracy that led
the Court to the position in Buckley now so widely criticized,
assimilating, as it did, regulation of campaign expenditures to a
constitutionally problematic self-entrenchment of political power by
skewing political dialogue. The ostensibly democratic argument to the
contrary emphasizes quite rightly, in support of such legislation,
reasonable substantive values of political equality, 37 but fails to
engage the barriers that the argument from democracy itself puts in
the way of pursuing such a goal in the domain identified by the
argument as the core of protected free speech. At this point, the
preferred conception of democracy is no longer procedural in Ely's
sense at all but substantive in a way that suggests independent
substantive principles against which the legitimacy of democracy is
being tested. The whole point of the argument for democracy, as a
33. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7.
34. See Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7; FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED,
supra note 7.
35. See Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 11; FISs, LIBERALISM
DIVIDED, supra note 7, at 28-29; SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 93-101.
36. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For my criticism, see RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 215-19.
37. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 94-101.
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way of avoiding substantive political theory, is now idle. Substantive
political theory is now doing all the work, albeit through a dark glass.
The point may be generalized as an objection to the argument
from democracy as a theory of free speech. The legitimate scope of
democratic debate may be interpreted either broadly or narrowly.
The narrow interpretation limits such debate to the issues directly in
controversy in political campaigns among the main contenders for
majoritarian political power.38 The broader interpretation construes
such debate as extending to any possible public issue, including the
very legitimacy of political power in general and democracy in
particular.39 Neither of these interpretations provides a secure and
convincing basis for the priority of speech as a constitutionally
protected interest. The narrow interpretation trivializes free speech by
restricting its scope to consensus politics; it thus excludes from
protection precisely the dissenting discourse outside the political
mainstream often most crucial to critical examination of central issues
of justice and the common good. The broader interpretation seems to
compromise democratic legitimacy by protecting attacks on the very
foundations of such legitimacy, including attacks on free speech itself. If
such attacks should be protected, as current American law indeed
requires,40 it seems rather strained to justify such protection on the
ground that it invariably advances democracy when the speech it allows
may sometimes self-consciously aim to subvert it. We value such speech
intrinsically, certainly not because it always advances democratically
determined policies and aims.
This latter point suggests that we value democracy or, to be more
precise, democratic constitutionalism to the extent that it respects
independent substantive values of free speech; and those values cannot
themselves be plausibly understood in terms of perfecting the
majoritarian political process. C. Edwin Baker recently put this point in
terms of a substantive value of equal respect for the moral self-
determination of all persons and assessed the legitimacy of democracy,
to the extent it is legitimate, as a political process that realizes that
independent value 1.4 Kent Greenawalt advanced a similar argument in
38. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 30-31 (1971). As a federal judge, Bork later offered a more expansive interpretation of this
requirement. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
39. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245, 255-63.
40. For a pertinent discussion, see RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 178-87.
41. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-51 (1989).
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terms of the remarkable American constitutional commitment to
principles of religious liberty and the important place of free speech in
giving proper expression to these principles.42 To the extent free speech
must give expression to the communicative interests of liberty of
conscience, the limitation of protection of free speech to politics is
clearly inadequate. As Greenawalt puts the point: "Once freedom of
religious ideas is acknowledged, distinguishing protected speech from
unprotected speech, say about science or personal morality, becomes
almost absurd.
'43
From the perspective of Baker and Greenawalt, constitutionally
legitimate political power must respect substantive spheres of moral
independence like liberty of conscience (including all matters of fact
and value fundamental to the exercise of conscience); the right of free
speech, through which persons exercise their constructive powers of
moral independence, must correlatively extend to all such matters. The
limitation of free speech protection to politics is, on this view,
illegitimate because it allows forms of censorship that deprive persons
of the inalienable liberties essential to the moral self-government of a
free people. Many of these liberties are not political in nature. The
limitation of free speech protection to the political is, therefore,
illegitimate because it fails the ultimate test of rights-based
constitutional legitimacy: the equal protection of the basic rights of free
persons.
Baker and Greenawalt suggest (in my view quite rightly) a larger
research project about the principles of democratic constitutionalism.
Those principles cannot, as a matter either of sound interpretation of
American constitutional tradition or of defensible democratic political
theory, be understood on the political process model of perfecting the
majoritarian political process, i.e., rendering the political process more
truly majoritarian (and therefore democratic). As an interpretive
matter, the constitutional tradition regards all forms of political power
(including the power of democratic majorities) as corruptible; it subjects
such power to a system of institutional constraints (including judicial
review) designed to harness such power to the legitimate ends of
government, namely the respect for human rights and the use of power
to advance the public good.44 A perfected political majoritarianism,
42. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 177-79
(1989).
43. Id. at 178.
44. For extensive development and exploration of this theme in American
constitutionalism, see RICHARDS, supra note 11.
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often hostile to respect for both human rights and the public good when
involving minorities, cannot be the measure of constitutional legitimacy.
As a matter of democratic political theory, political process models
usually rest on a form of preference utilitarianism. Such utilitarianism
not only has already mentioned defects as an account of current
American law; it has independently been subjected to searching
contemporary criticism as an inadequate normative theory of equality.
Part of this criticism has been that its theory of equality fails to give
adequate expression to the place of respect for human rights in the
normative idea of treating persons as equals. 45 We need an alternative
view of democratic constitutionalism that better captures, both as a
matter of sound interpretation and of defensible political theory, the
ways in which constitutional principles subject the exercise of political
power to scrutiny and constraint.
D. The Toleration Model of Free Speech
We need to return to substantive normative political theory, but of
a non-teleological, deontological sort, that better captures the
normative structure of constitutional argument in terms of a set of
principles that recognize basic human rights to be accorded all persons
as equals, prior to the legitimate pursuit of other political goals and
purposes. At this point, I want to sketch such an alternative view,
explain its roots in American constitutional thought, and consider some
of its distinctive consequences for the understanding of the place and
role of free speech in American constitutional law.
The theories of religious liberty and free speech are natural starting
points for an alternative research project for constitutionalism because
the American doctrines of religious liberty and free speech are pivotal
constructive components of the kind of reasonable public argument in
terms of which exercises of political power must be justified if they are
to be constitutionally legitimate. Constitutional argument in the United
States has a dignity and weight distinctive from ordinary political
argument because it addresses the fundamental question of what lends
legitimacy to any exercise of political power. It was fundamental to this
constitutional project from its inception not only that all forms of
political power were corruptible, but that they had been and were
corruptible in a distinctive way. Corruptible political power had
deprived persons of the capacity to know, understand, and make
45. The now classic contemporary treatment of this point is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
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effective claim to their basic human rights by entrenching sectarian
views as the measure of what could count either as a legitimate
conviction or as an expression of such conviction. As a consequence,
political power had been distorted from its proper role in the pursuit of
the justice of equal rights and advancing the interests of all alike in
pursuit of the public good.46 The argument for religious toleration was,
for leading American constitutionalists like Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison,47 a model for both the corruptibility of political power
(subverting the inalienable right to conscience) and its constitutional
remedy (namely, depriving the state of any power to enforce or endorse
sectarian religious belief, unless in service of a compelling secular
purpose reasonably accessible to all as based on general goods
irrespective of other philosophical or religious disagreements). In effect,
the exercise of political power for religious ends had entrenched a
sectarian conception of religious truth as the measure of all reasonable
inquiry about religious matters; it thus had deprived persons of their
inalienable human rights reasonably to exercise their own moral powers
about such matters. Such exercises of political power entrenched a kind
of self-perpetuating political irrationalism that deprived people of
reasonable government; political power was exercised in ways that
neither respected people's right to reasonable self-government in their
own moral and religious life, nor subjected its own power to reasonable
criticism in terms of equal justice and the public good. Arguments of
constitutional principle have the weight that they do precisely because
they subject such corruptions of political power to appropriate
constraint in service of the reasonable justification of political power in
terms of respect for rights and the use of political power to advance
justice and the public good.
The principle of free speech plays the central role it does among
constitutional principles and structures because it deprives the state of
power over speech based on self-entrenching judgments of the worth or
value of the range of speech that protects the inalienable right to
conscience, i.e., sincere convictions about matters of fact and value in
which a free people reasonably has a higher-order interest. That interest
is nothing less than the free exercise of the moral powers of their reason
through which persons give enduring value to their lives and
communities."u Speech in the relevant sense must be free from certain
46. For a general development of this theme, see RICHARDS, supra note 11.
47. For further discussion, see RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 111-16.
48. See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971).
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forms of state control to insure that censorious state judgments are not
the measure of reasonable discussion in society at large and to allow the
broadest possible exercise of the reasonable powers of a free people
consistent with both respect for their human rights and their rights as
citizens to hold political power accountable in terms of its respect for
such rights and the public good. If constitutional argument depends for
its dignity and weight on subjecting political power to such independent
tests of reasonable justification, free speech is the foundation for the
practicability of such justification; it insures a constitutional space for
the kind of reasonable public argument against which, on grounds of
constitutional legitimacy, all forms of political power must be subject to
open debate and criticism. It would, of course, doom the entire project
to emptiness and triviality if the state's majoritarian judgments of the
worth or value of speech were the procrustean measure to which all
such discourse must be fitted.
The nerve of this argument is implicit in the way James Madison
argued that the principle of free speech is an elaboration of the
argument for liberty of conscience as an inalienable human right.49 The
argument for religious toleration was, as I earlier suggested, that the
state may have no power over religion because enforceable state
judgments about the worth or value of particular religious beliefs fail to
respect the right of persons reasonably to make such judgments for
themselves. The idea is not that the state is always mistaken in judging
certain religious views to be false or noxious; rather, judgments of that
sort cannot, in principle, be made by a state committed to respect for
the right of people reasonably to exercise their own judgment in these
matters. In his seminal formulation of the Virginia Bill for Religious
Freedom, Jefferson put the point thus:
[T]o restrain the profession or propagation of principles on
supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous falacy, which at
once destroys all religious liberty, because [the civil magistrate]
being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the
rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others
only as they shall square with or differ from his own.50
In effect, abridgment of religious liberty could not be justified on
sectarian grounds but could only be justified on independent grounds of
preventing harms to secular general goods like life, liberty, and
property. As Jefferson put the point, "[lit is time enough for the rightful
49. See RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 173-82.
50. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1950).
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purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles
break out into overt acts against peace and good order"; the normal
means for rebuttal of noxious belief, consistent with respect for the right
of conscience, is "free argument and debate."51 As he wrote elsewhere:
"[It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or
no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg. ' 52 The limitation
of the exercise of state power to the protection of general goods
expresses respect for the diverse ways that people may interpret and
weigh life, liberty, and property consistently with the independent
exercise of their moral powers.
Madison saw that the same argument justified a special protection
for speech because the state was inclined to make and enforce the same
kinds of illegitimate judgments about the worth of the speech through
which we express, develop, and revise conscientiously held beliefs.
Accordingly, the principle of free speech took the form of a prohibition
against the enforcement of state judgments about the truth or worth of
what is said (thus anticipating the contemporary free speech doctrine
forbidding content-based restrictions on speech).53 The criterion for the
abridgment of speech was the same as Jefferson's criterion for the
abridgment of religious liberty; speech may be abridged only "when
principles break out into overt acts" inflicting secular harms (a criterion
anticipating the highly demanding contemporary American
requirements for satisfaction of the "clear and present danger" test,
namely, the danger of some imminent, nonrebuttable, and very grave
secular harm).54
Madison's expansive view of protection derives from a
deontological contractualist conception of political legitimacy; state
power is only acceptable when it acts in ways that no person,
understood to have basic higher-order interests in rational and
reasonable self-government, could reasonably reject.55 From this
perspective, conscience is an inalienable human right constitutionally
immune from political power because, consistent with this contractualist
conception, it is the right that enables persons, on terms of equal
respect, to be the sovereign moral critics of values, including political
51. Id. at 546.
52. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., 1954)
(1787) (footnote omitted).
53. See RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 165-227.
54. See id. at 178-87.
55. See T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND
103, 103-28 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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values like the legitimacy of government. Constitutionally guaranteed
respect for this right insures that free and equal persons are the ultimate
judges of whether the government respects their rights and pursues the
public good in a way that justifies obedience and, if so, on what terms
and to what extent. The scope of free speech protection, thus
understood, must in its nature be much more expansive than the actual
cases when political power is illegitimate or, more extremely, when
revolution might be justified. The point of free speech is not that
revolution is often justified on grounds of rights-based political
illegitimacy, but that the deliberative question of ultimate political
legitimacy must, consistent with respect for the inalienable right to
conscience, be always vividly addressed to the public mind of a free
people if they are to be the ultimate free and equal sovereigns in terms
of whose just claims political power must be searchingly tested and held
accountable. Persons could not reasonably reject this constitutional
principle because it insures the only reasonable basis for holding
political power accountable to the basic requirements of its own
legitimacy. But the protections of speech-which are also protections of
conscience-cannot be limited to religious speech narrowly understood
(as Jefferson, for example, supposed). 56 Madison's objection to the
prosecutions brought by the federal government under the Alien and
Sedition Act of 1798 was that they sought to enforce a suspect judgment
of the worth of speech (notably, speech critical of the government) that
improperly allowed the government's own beliefs about the legitimate
scope of political criticism to settle the issue of what people might and
should find reasonable.57 This was, of course, the same abuse of state
power Jefferson noted in religious persecution. If anything, the
temptations to such abuse would be as at least as great in the case of
speech expressly critical of the state. Accordingly, speech should enjoy
at least a comparable kind of protection.58 Nothing in Madison's
argument, however, endorses, as Sunstein quite mistakenly supposes,5 9
the argument from democracy as the measure or limit of free speech.
56. For Jefferson's quite restrictive conception of the scope of free speech (in contrast to his
expansive protection of religious liberty), see LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 42-69 (1973).
57. See James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 546-80 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippencott 1888).
58. For a recent important historical study of the background of early American journalism
that was the context of Madison's argument, see JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS
FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988).
59. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at xvi-xx, 18-23.
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Madison's defense of free speech is, as we have seen, rooted in the
argument for toleration, which extends the protection of free speech as
broadly as the underlying right to conscience and threats thereto. These
included, as Madison made clear, seditious libel laws, not because such
laws were political, but because they so politically threatened the moral
integrity of the underlying right of conscience. What Madison clearly
takes to be the underlying grounds for an expansive protection of
speech (moral independence of conviction), extending to blatant
political threats (like seditious libel laws), has been quite erased, means
inverted into ends, doing interpretive justice neither to our Madisonian
history nor political theory.
The scope of Madisonian protection is clearly responsive to an
evolving public understanding of the extent of reasonable conscientious
debate about values. As the scope of reasonable application of the idea
of protected conscience widens, so must the scope of free speech. Such
background shifts may thus explain the expanding class of expressions
to which the American judiciary now applies the guarantees of free
speech and free press. For example, subversive advocacy 6° and group
libel61 are now fully protected; and much that was traditionally excluded
from free speech protection -fighting words,62  defamation of
individuals,63 obscene materials, 64 and advertising65 - is now more fully
protected. Madison himself expanded the scope of the argument from
free conscience to protect public criticism both of religion and of the
state; and the modem judiciary has further expanded the argument to
protect expressions of dissent from suppression by majorities essentially
motivated by hostility to such dissent, rather than by the desire to
combat clear and present dangers of secular harms. As Madison clearly
saw, the pattern of intolerance familiar in unjust religious persecution
occurs as well in the censorship of speech; and the modern United
States Supreme Court has correctly understood that the same
protections fundamental to our Jeffersonian conception of religious
liberty apply, as a matter of principle, to free speech.
The theory quite cogently explains, for example, something that
60. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
61. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
62. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
63. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For an illuminating recent
commentary on this development in American constitutional law, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No
LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
64. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).




both the utilitarian and political process models have difficulty in
explaining, namely, the inclusion of subversive advocacy in free speech
protection. From a utilitarian perspective, as Holmes himself clearly
saw, speech advocating the subversion of constitutional institutions, at
least when made by a socialist political leader of the eloquence and
effectiveness of Eugene Debs,66 is sufficiently dangerous to warrant
suppression on utilitarian grounds ("puny anonymities" are quite
another matter67). And from the political process perspective, as earlier
suggested, why should speech-itself subversive of democracy-be
protected at all? But from the perspective of the toleration model here
proposed, subversive advocacy, precisely because it makes substantive
claims that go to the very legitimacy of constitutional government, is at
the very core of free speech protection. Such advocacy conscientiously
addresses the public conscience of the community in terms of putative
failures to so respect rights and the public good that disobedience,
indeed revolution, is justified. From the perspective of a conception of
free speech rooted in respect for freedom of conscience about ultimate
issues of value like justice and the right to rebel, that is the speech most
worthy of protection. It raises the questions of public conscience central
to a free society; the constitutional guarantee of the moral
independence of such speech and speakers from state majoritarian
censorship insures that the legitimacy of state power is subject to
searching and impartial testing in terms of its respect for universal
human rights and the public interest. It is very much the point of such
robust protection of free speech that, precisely because of such
protection, the claims of subversive advocates thus protected will be
tested by the deliberative judgment of a people empowered by their
freedom responsibly to assess such claims. Often they will reject such
claims as false and unjustified; sometimes, they will accept them. The
meaning of free speech is the impartial moral independence of the
testing.
The theory of free speech proposed here straightforwardly
explains, in a way in which other views do not, the special priority of
free speech and our grounds for skepticism about certain state
abridgments of speech. The speech protected is coextensive not with all
speech, or with speech as such, but with the independent
communication of willing speakers and audiences sincerely engaged in
the critical discussion and rebuttal central to the conscientious
66. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
67. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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formation, revision, and evaluation of values in living against the
background of the threats to such moral independence identified by the
argument for toleration. The constitutional priority accorded free
speech, thus understood, is given weight in terms of a deontological
contractualist political theory of equal respect for persons. The theory
thus explains, in a way utilitarianism cannot, the weight accorded our
interest in speech as opposed to our other interests, and explains, in a
way perfectionism cannot, the egalitarian basis of this interest in the role
conscience plays in the higher-order moral interests of all persons. It
also explains, in a way the argument from democracy cannot, how and
why this interest extends beyond the political narrowly or broadly
construed to include our moral interests as persons.
On the other hand, the theory suggests reasonable limits on the
scope of protection of free speech. For example, some communications
do not serve such independent conscientious expression and rebuttal
about critical values. Some may bypass reflective capacities (subliminal
advertising); others do not express sincere evaluative convictions but
knowingly make false statements of fact (fraud and knowing or reckless
defamation of individuals68); and still others state true facts in which
there is no ground for a reasonable interest from the perspective of the
critical expression and discussion of general values. Because of the
fundamental structural importance of the protection of the right to
conscience to political legitimacy, the line between protected and
unprotected speech should be drawn in the way that gives the broadest
reasonable protection to moral independence in the expression and
discussion of values; speech should be regarded as unprotected only on
a strong showing of no reasonable ground for protection on this basis.
In such cases of unprotected speech, the state may, consistent with the
principle of free speech, pursue legitimate secular interests such as
protection from consumer fraud and protection of individual reputation
and privacy, harms to individuals not subject to rebuttal in public debate
in the way in which disagreements over values are. It is therefore not an
objection to a theory of free speech grounded in the communicative
independence of our rational powers that the theory fails to
accommodate such legitimate regulatory interests; the theory, properly
68. By reckless defamation, I mean not mere negligence in stating a false fact but subjective
awareness that a fact stated is likely to be false. On my view, both knowledge of the falsity of one's
statements of fact or awareness of likely falsity thereof remove such statements from the core of free
speech protection, since in both cases the statements are not the sincere expression of conviction. In
contrast to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and subsequent cases, my view
does not turn on the speech being about public officials or figures and would tend wholly to
immunize conscientious public speech from abridgement by libel actions of any kind.
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understood, gives them proper weight.69 In general, free speech has the
priority we accord it against a background of reasonable state
regulations (including fair time, place, and manner regulations7 0) that
afford a supportive framework of communicative dialogue among free,
rational, and equal persons and a constitutionally reasonable pursuit of
legitimate state interests without prejudice to free speech.
Correspondingly, our skepticism about state power over speech is
rooted not in a general suspicion of the state as such but in a desire to
avoid specific evils that our constitutional tradition identifies in
historically familiar patterns of persecutory state intolerance of moral
and political criticism. This explains the background principle of
toleration that prohibits the state's enforcement of its own judgments
about the critical worth of public speech. Laws condemned by this
principle include not only seditious-libel laws that prohibit either
express or implied criticism of the government. This principle condemns
as well state prohibitions of speech motivated by the offense taken by
groups of citizens at the critical advocacy of values of other groups; such
prohibitions improperly substitute state enforcement of general views
believed to be true for the play of the critical moral powers of free and
equal people engaged in responsible discourse.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GROUP LIBEL LAWS
It is this reason of principle that may explain and justify why group
libel laws (laws making it a criminal or civil wrong to engage in
defamation of racial, ethnic, or religious groups) are currently
constitutionally suspect in the United States.71 The reason is this: The
principle of free speech, properly understood, discriminates among
kinds of interests that may enjoy weight in the balance of political
argument about free speech (for example, consumer protection or
reputational integrity or privacy) and disentitles certain other interests
to any weight whatsoever. These latter interests include offense taken at
the exercise of the right of conscience itself, i.e., arguments for the
69. For a somewhat fuller development of this theme, see RICHARDS, supra note 11, at 195-
201; and RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 188-226.
70. For a somewhat fuller development of this point, see RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 173, 194,
217,220,225.
71. The constitutionality of such laws (directed at general normative claims) must be
distinguished from the question of laws directed against ad hominem insulting epithets of a sort
contextually highly likely to lead to violence, so-called "fighting words." See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). However, constitutional protection of offensive public speech,
making general claims, may require that the latter laws be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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repression of conscientious speech based on offense taken at the general
evaluative merits of what is said, in effect, a kind of general "ideological
fighting words."72 A free speech balancing consequentialism predicated
on giving weight to such interests (triggered by offense of this sort) may
be radically misconceived. Whatever a clear and present danger may
reasonably mean, it cannot, consistent with respect for the right to
conscience, mean this. The conception of "harms" (sufficient to justify
state action) in this case is defined by the objection that offended people
take to the conscientious advocacy of certain general views, and the
enforceable state judgments are based on this sense of offense. At
bottom, the offense taken at a form of conscience (viewed as corrupt) is
sufficient to abridge the exercise of conscience. Such a ground for
repressive state action is, in principle, unacceptable, for the same reason
that the equal moral independence of conscience is, in principle,
immune from state power. The state can, consistent with respect for
conscience, no more proscribe conscientious moral convictions on such
a basis than it can religious or political convictions. Disagreements
about issues of conscience (including the corruption of conscience)
must, in a free society, be resolved through the free exercise of
conscience in debate that appeals to free public reason. Conscience can
only be free in this way if a putative error in conscience is not a
sufficient basis for state censorship in the domain of conscientious
conviction and expression.
If this argument is based on a proper understanding of the right to
conscience as an inalienable human right, it will clarify its force and
weight to contrast its American interpretation of these matters with the
ostensibly rights-based forms of constitutionalism that take a different
view of the constitutionality of group libel, indeed that accept group
libel as itself a protection of rights. German constitutionalism is usefully
illustrative. This constitutional system, like many others,73 justifies the
prohibition of group libel in rights-based terms of another right defined
either as "the right to inviolability of personal honour" 74 or a general
guarantee that "[t]he dignity of man shall be inviolable. '75 This general
72. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 95
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
73. See, e.g., JANIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 471 app. A (Article 10, European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights).
74. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 2, at 7 (Article 5(2))
(limits on the scope of protection of the rights of free speech and press under Article 5(1)).
75. Id. at 6 (Article 1(1)) (setting general limits on otherwise absolute rights like the right of art
and science, research, and teaching under Article 5(3)). For an example of judicial balancing of this
sort, see Mephisto Case, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal
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framework of free speech analysis in Germany is older than the current
German constitutional order. Its current sense is, however, framed by a
distinctive feature of current German constitutionalism, its commitment
to militant democracy; on this view, democracy must be protected
against groups and persons that would subvert its general constitutional
principles.76 As I earlier suggested, some rights (like that of individual
reputation, and of privacy) may reasonably be legally protected to the
extent they do not conflict with the right of free speech. But these rights
in their nature fall in spheres (willfully false statement of facts about
individuals or statement of private facts in which there is no reasonable
public interest) that do not trench upon the core interests of free speech,
the conscientious discussion and criticism of public matters of fact, and
value by people free of improperly censorious state judgments about
the worth or value of such discussion. But the German rights of honor
or dignity are not similarly so limited.77 Rather, the state may prohibit
conscientious expression of general evaluative views essentially on the
ground that persons experience such expression as disrespectful.78 In
effect, the scope of public debate is to be circumscribed to the measure
of ideological inoffensiveness to important persons and groups in
society (as those persons and groups are defined by the state).
People do often identify themselves with some larger group with
Constitutional Court] 30 (1971), 173 (F.R.G.), translated in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLC OF GERMANY 309-12, 426-30
(1989).
76. See BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 2, at 7 (Article
5(3)) (obligation of loyalty of university teachers to the constitution), 8 (Article 9(2)) (prohibition of
associations directed against the constitutional order), 13 (Article 18) (abuse of rights like free
speech can lead to forfeiture of such rights), 15 (Article 20(4)) (in the absence of any available
alternative, all Germans given right of resistance against anyone attempting to overthrow the
constitutional order), 15 (Article 21(2)) (on the basis of a finding of the Constitutional Court,
unconstitutionality of political parties directed against the basic democratic order). For associated
legal developments, see generally Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law
Against the "Auschwitz"-and Other- "Lies", 85 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1986).
77. The problem is not limited to group libel alone; German constitutional law, like that of
other European countries, permits its individual libel laws to encompass disparaging value
statements about public figures. For a case illustrative of this approach, see Street Theatre Case,
BVerfGE 67 (1984), 213 (F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 75, at 431-36. For the
contrasting American approach, see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
78. It would be a closer case if group libel laws were limited to knowingly false statement of
facts about groups, statements that therefore do not express conviction and therefore are not sincere
expressions of conscience. In my judgment, the constitutionally relevant difference between such a
more circumscribed form of group libel action and an individual libel action would be that the
former is embedded in general debate about values that can be rebutted in the usual way; in
contrast, individual libel is targeted at an individual as such and can only be adequately rebutted by
the forms of legal actions through which persons uphold their reputation. For this reason, even a
more circumscribed form of group libel action would violate the principle of free speech. I am
indebted to Thomas Franck for this clarification of my thinking.
1999]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
whom they associate their self-respect; they take a lively interest in how
they take such groups and thus themselves to be represented and
discussed in the public culture of their societies, and sometimes
experience reasonable indignation at such discussions as forms of
heresy, blasphemy, or group libel challenging their essential values in
living, indeed the very core of their identities. Such indignation cannot,
however, count as a harm sufficient to limit free speech protection, as it
would be if such indignation gave rise to a right of sufficient force (as it
does under German law) to limit the scope of application of the right of
free speech. The German constitutional theory wrongly counts the
occasion of such indignation as a secular evil from which free people
may, like threats to physical integrity, be protected. In fact, a proper
understanding of free speech as toleration regards such occasions as
precisely the kinds of spiritual challenge to public discussion and debate
that the tradition of free speech should protect and encourage.
Otherwise, the essential public rights and responsibilities of a free and
democratic people (indeed, the core of their inalienable rights) are
illegitimately transferred to others, who protect citizens from even
hearing speech they might find offensive. A people, thus protected, may
privately gain in peace of mind, but such privatization deprives a free
people of the inalienable public liberties and responsibilities of
citizenship that alone dignify them as a people worthy of freedom
(reasonably confronting the central issues of public conscience of their
age and culture). For this reason, such indignation should, consistent
with the values of free speech, express itself not in censorship but in
creative forms of voluntary organization to rebut such arguments in the
usual way. As we have seen, the principle of free speech is grounded in
skepticism about the corruptibility of political power in the domain of
the conscientious expression of public values; state judgments about the
worth or value of speech in this domain fail to allow proper scope to the
reasonable debate of morally independent and free persons about
public matters of fact and value. Such reasonable skepticism extends as
well to state abridgments of speech ostensibly grounded in protecting
groups from disrespectful speech. The point is not that such speech is
not sometimes disrespectful of groups and persons or that conscience is
not sometimes corrupt but that the prohibition of such speech by the
state makes the state the improper enforcer of that respect as the arbiter
of what counts as a good or bad conscience in a domain of public debate
where enforcement of this kind contemptuously usurps the sovereign
right of persons to be the ultimate critics of value in living. Respect for
liberty of conscience requires of us the minimal civic courage of
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overcoming the fear of hearing views we detest and disallowing such
fears of freedom as the basis of state censorship. Such a risk, if it is a
risk, is reasonably borne if we, as free people, both understand and
value the foundational role in a just polity of the sovereign public and
reason about issues of conscience it makes available to all on fair terms.
The interposition of the state in these matters enlists state power in
the support and legitimation of what counts as a group identity and the
proper respect owed that identity as the measure of what can count as
reasonable public debate about such matters. But, the state's judgments
in this domain are no more impartially reasonable than they are in the
area of religion or politics; the state here enforces inevitably crude
majoritarian stereotypes of group identity on a par with similarly
illegitimate enforceable state judgments about true religion and good
politics. The relationship between individual and group identity must, in
a free society, be open to the fullest range of reasonable discussion and
debate on terms that allow persons to question, debate, and renegotiate
their evaluative understanding of value in living on their own terms,
including the relationship between their sense of themselves as
individuals and as self-identified members of various groups. Perhaps
the relationship between individual and group identity will be more
reasonably contestable in a society as ethnically diverse and
ideologically pluralistic as the United States than it is in more
homogeneous societies; even in more homogeneous societies, the terms
of individual and group identity must, in those that are free societies, be
open to broad and robust discussion and debate to allow the fullest
range of public intelligence and imagination reasonably to be available
to all on terms that respect moral autonomy and individuality.
Otherwise, essential issues of public debate about value in living-the
very terms of one's moral integrity-will be truncated to the measure of
unreflective and often oppressive majoritarian stereotypes.
Much serious discussion of public values could, in virtue of the
German rights of honor or dignity, give rise to state protection of
persons who take offense at such discussion. The general structure of
German constitutional argument imposes a duty on the state to protect
rights.79 In effect, the legitimacy of state power turns, like the
comparable American Lockean constitutional theory, 0 on the way in
79. For judicial elaboration on this point, see Schleyer Kidnapping Case, BVerfGE 46 (1977),
160 (F.R.G), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 75, at 362-63; Abortion Case, BVerfGE 39 (1975), 1
(F.R.G.), translated in id. at 348-59; and Princess Soraya Case, BVerfGE 34 (1973), 269 (F.R.G.),
translated in id. at 131-36.
80. See generally RICHARDS, supra note 11.
1999]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
which the state organizes and protects the basic rights of its people,
including their basic rights of conscience, life, personal security, and the
like. To this extent, the German constitutional theory is normatively
appealing on grounds of its commitment to the protection of human
rights. But the interpretation of this theory to include protection from
offensive discussion rests on an inadequate understanding of the weight
of free speech in such an overall theory of constitutional legitimacy.
This interpretation does not take seriously the nature of the right of free
speech in question, precisely because respect for this right requires a
principled skepticism about abuses of state power in a certain domain.
In short, the central concern of free speech is not protection by the state
but from the state. In the area of free speech, however, the German
interpretation of this theory of the state as the positivistic source and
protector of rights here subverts such protection by its legitimation of an
improper state role, an illiberal moral paternalism in the domain of
conscience directed at protecting people from offense to their
convictions, in effect, from challenge and debate. Such "protection," if
carried to its logical extreme, might homogenize the complacencies of a
public opinion that concurs on bromides and symbolic gestures of group
solidarity; it does not empower people responsibly to understand, claim,
and enforce their human rights as free and reasonable people.
There is a larger point worth making here, associated with the
relationship of this view of free speech to the idea of defensive
democracy. The protection of human rights, if it means anything, cannot
be limited in its scope to those who, in the view of the state, support and
do not subvert the constitutional order. A constitutional order,
ostensibly grounded in the protection of human rights, must extend
human rights to all subject to its political power. German
constitutionalism undoubtedly espouses this general constitutional
theory and surely self-consciously means to transcend more traditional
German national ideologies constructed around rights-skeptical
polarities of friends and enemies81 often founded on retaining the purity
of the nation's allegedly constitutive ethnic homogeneity.82 But the
81. For a clear statement and defense of such a German national ideology, see CARL SCHMrrT,
THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 1976). For an illuminating account of
Schmitt's life and work, including his complicity with the Nazi regime, see JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY,
CARL ScHMiTr: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983). Schmitt's complicity with the Nazis places him,
like Heidegger, among the leading German intellectuals of their period now very much under
critical scrutiny in Germany and elsewhere as part of a tradition that the new German constitutional
order very much wants to repudiate. On Heidegger, see VICTOR FARIAS, HEIDEGGER AND
NAZISM (1989). It would be paradoxical indeed if German constitutional doctrines like defensive
democracy were, as I suggest, very much an unconscious thrall to such a now repudiated tradition.
82. For a development of this idea as central to the modem idea of political democracy, see
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German constitutional ideology of defensive democracy is in tension
with its more fundamental commitment to inalienable human rights;
indeed, its terms suggest the return of the repressed, the older ideology
of friends and enemies that it surely means constructively to transcend.
Correlatively, its limitation of the right to free speech (by rights of
honor or dignity) is unjustifiable for the same reason. The protection of
the right to conscience, as an inalienable human right, must extend to all
persons within the scope of its principle, namely, those who
conscientiously express views on matters of public value and fact.
Respect is owed them as persons who originate views and claims and
who have the right to authenticate themselves by speaking
conscientiously in their own voice and their own terms. The principle of
free speech requires that each person is guaranteed the greatest equal
liberty to exercise this right in its proper domain consistent with a like
liberty for all. It subverts the principled moral force of this right to
truncate its protection in terms of some range of views that are
politically or morally mainstream and others that are not. This makes
ideological conformity, not respect for the human rights of all persons
(whatever their convictions), the measure of membership in the
constitutional community. As I earlier argued, respect for a right like
free speech enjoys its greatest moral force when it extends its protection
even to subversive advocates who challenge its authority; the same
point applies here to group libel. Respect for the moral sovereignty of
dissenters from mainstream views makes the best statement that could
be made about the constitutive inner morality of a constitutional
community based on respect for human rights.
There is legitimate political power enough to deal with those
dissenters who would move beyond dissent to overt acts that threaten
the rights of others (for further discussion, see below). Most dissenters
do not do so, and many non-dissenters will threaten such acts. The
principle of free speech insists that the mere offense taken at dissenting
views cannot be the measure of a clear and present danger sufficient to
justify the abridgment of speech. Jefferson's earlier cited point about
religious liberty applies here as well: "[the civil magistrate] being of
course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of
judgment, '83 thus falsely and mischievously conflating ideological
dissidence with overt acts that violate rights.
The issue of constitutional principle may be more abstractly stated.
CARL SCHMITr, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 9 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 1985).
83. Jefferson, supra note 50, at 546.
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The principle of free speech arises from an historical skepticism, rooted
in rights-based political theory, about the uses of state power to
homogenize public opinion by the use of its coercive power to
criminalize heresy or blasphemy or seditious libel and the like. In each
case, criminal prohibitions of thought and speech were based on state
judgments about the worth or value of thought and speech (on the
ground of a putative corruption of conscience); such judgments both
unreasonably limited the scope of thought and discussion to the
measure of the dominant political orthodoxy and correlatively deprived
persons of their inalienable rights reasonably to think and discuss public
matters as free people. The principle of free speech, based on rights-
based skepticism about such enforceable political judgments, must
extend to all such judgments, including those based on the offense taken
by persons to conscientious views expressed by other persons. Such
constitutional concern must apply not only to group libel prosecutions
but to prohibitions analogously based on disrespectful thoughts and
speech.
This understanding properly includes not only the inclusion of
subversive advocacy in the scope of protected speech (for reasons
already examined), but group libel as well. 84 Such laws make it a
criminal or civil wrong to engage in defamation of racial, ethnic, or
religious groups. Such laws require a demonstration that claims made
about certain groups subject its members to a false disparagement of
social esteem like the harm inflicted on a person by a libel of him as
an individual.8 But, the analogy to individual libel is defective in ways
of the gravest constitutional concern. Individual libel actions have two
distinctive features: they require the publication of false facts, often
known to be false or easily ascertainable as such; and belief in such
false facts by the audience disparages the reputation of the individual
expressly written or spoken about. But the communications,
restricted by group libel, express general conscientious views of
84. Despite earlier views to the contrary, see, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952), cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which strike down subversive
advocacy statutes applied to speech fomenting racial and religious hatred and bigotry, suggest
that group libel statutes directed against the expression of false racial or religious stereotypes, as
such, would be similarly unconstitutional. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(holding unconstitutional a city ordinance condemning placing on public or private property a
symbol that arouses anger on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender, here applied to
a crossburning on a black family's lawn); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding
unconstitutional the attempts of Skokie, Illinois, a heavily Jewish community, to stop a pending
march of the Nazi party in Skokie).
85. For a classic defense, see generally David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation:
Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 727 (1942).
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speakers and audiences, whose nature and effect both depend on
evaluative conceptions. Group libel actions, in contrast to individual
libel actions, require the state to make abstract evaluative judgments
about the value of what is said and about the legitimacy of the
objection taken to the assertions. These state judgments about the
nature and effect of communicative utterances place group libel laws
at the heart of the values of free speech. In effect, a broad range of
personal grievances at hearing conscientious views opposed to one's
own (and rebuttable as such) triggers state prohibitions. Inevitably,
such laws impose state restrictions in the core area of evaluative
conceptions appealing to the moral powers of speakers and audiences
on the basis of state judgments of the worth of such conceptions, thus
usurping the sovereign moral judgment of the people.
86
Such state usurpation of moral judgment is of special concern
from the perspective of the role of free speech in the ethical
empowerment of the politics of identity. Group libel laws thus rest on
enforceable state judgments of group harm in the domain of
conviction, judgments that interpret what can and should count as the
stereotypical harms inflicted by structural injustice. Such majoritarian
judgments, if enforced through law in the domain of speech, mandate a
kind of orthodoxy of appropriate tribalization in the terms of public
discourse. Public claims disrespectful of groups are subject to state
prohibition. But, this empowers the state to determine not only what
discourse is properly respectful and what is not, but what groups are
entitled to such protection and what are not. But such state-enforced
judgments introduce stereotypical political orthodoxies as the measure
of human identity, thus removing from public discourse precisely the
contest of such stereotypical boundaries that a free people often most
reasonably requires. The identity of no moral person can be
exhaustively defined by their ethnicity or race or gender or sexual
preference or any of the other terms of common group identification
familiar today. The social force such group identifications often have
today unreasonably diminishes both the range of diversity and
individuality that exists within such groups and the similarities between
members of such groups and the groups with which they are contrasted.
To enforce such identifications through law in the domain of conscience
censors from public discourse precisely the kind of discourse that best
challenges them. Such state censorship of a range of discourse stifles, in
86. For my earlier criticism of these laws, see RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 190-93; for a
similar criticism, see KALVEN, supra note 6, at 7-64.
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turn, the empowering protests of individuals to that discourse through
which they express, demand, and define their individuality as persons
against such stereotypical classifications. 87 Paradoxically, it is precisely
the groups that the state may regard itself as most reasonably protecting
from group libel (the most historically stigmatized groups, like blacks in
the United States, or Jews in Europe, or women and sexual minorities
generally) that should, as a matter of free speech principle, most
reasonably be constitutionally immunized from such protective state
power. Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man pled for racial justice in America
in these eloquent terms: "Our task is that of making ourselves
individuals. The conscience of a race is the gift of its individuals .... 88
If the struggle against the stereotypical indignities of racism (or anti-
Semitism or sexism or homophobia) is essentially a struggle for
individuality, free speech rightly requires that the terms of emancipation
must be the empowering responsibility of individuals, including the
voluntary organizations through which they define themselves and their
struggle. Otherwise, ethical protest degenerates into a tribalism that
may uncritically, in the name of rectifying one prejudice (racism), inflict
another (anti-Semitism).89
The politics of identity arise from ethically transformative protest
of the terms of one's moral slavery. It is the very making of such rights-
based claims, in one's own voice, that challenges one's dehumanization
as not a bearer of human rights, making space for the free exercise of
one's moral powers in the reasonable criticism of such structural
injustice. Only a principle of free speech, which insists on equal
treatment of all conscientious convictions, insures both the legitimacy
and the integrity of such politics of identity. On the one hand, in terms
of legitimacy, it alone assures all contestants to these debates the
normatively required respect for each and every person's right to
conscience, which is inalienable in the sense that it is each person's
responsibility (not to be surrendered to any other person, let alone to
the state); such equality in the domain of conscience, particularly in
87. On the important strand of American free speech thought emphasizing expressive
authenticity, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
(1990). Unfortunately, Shiffrin wrongly isolates this romantic Emersonian strand of thought from
the neo-Kantian theorists, like myself, who find in American neo-abolitionist transcendentalism a
clear and enduring strand of Kantian thought, argument, and practice. See generally RICHARDS,
CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8.
88. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 354 (1989).
89. For a recent claim along these lines, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,




areas of ongoing controversy and debate over basic questions of justice,
expresses the standpoint of public reason that aspires, to the extent
feasible, to legitimate political power (including criticisms and reforms
thereof) in terms that can be reasonably justified to all, as free and equal
persons and citizens. 90 On the other hand, from the perspective of
integrity, such egalitarian responsibility empowers the reasonable
demands and criticisms of the politics of identity from a more
demanding critical standpoint morally independent of the state; such
moral independence affords a public standpoint of impartiality that
promotes more reasonable public discussion and debate, on terms of
principle, of the dehumanizing stereotypes that unjustly rationalize the
cultural entrenchment of structural injustice; it better insures, from the
standpoint of those subjected to such stereotypes, that those stereotypes
are more reasonably contested as the insult to individuality that they
are. Such stereotypes of race or gender or gendered sexuality naturalize
injustice in complex cultural constructions that often mask the fact of
their unjust cultural construction.91 We need more, not less, open and
robust discussion and debate about such cultural constructions. The
kind of state power invoked by group libel laws, precisely because it
claims a transparent understanding of what counts as a group harm in
the domain of conscience, unreasonably censors such debate when it is
most needed. The state (so complicitous with the construction of
structural injustice) has no such transparent understanding in this
domain that it can legitimately claim. Only the most robust and free
discussion of these issues can reasonably confront us with the cultural
depth and complexity of structural injustice, implicating not only
abridgments of the right to conscience and speech but the rights to
intimate life and work as well through the enforcement of
dehumanizing stereotypes of unjust sexualization that often privatize
such injustice. It is an important cultural fact about the entrenchment of
such structural injustice that its political force has been traditionally
unspoken and even unspeakable. The American principle of free
speech has played the role it has in the understanding and remedy of
such entrenchment by insisting on both the right and responsibility of
protesting voice as alone adequate reasonably to break the silence that
entrenches structural injustice. The observance of the principle of free
speech, in the terms I have defended it, does not retard the remedy of
90. For development of this contractualist theme, see RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 57-63.
91. For fuller discussion on the cultural construction of structural injustice (in the areas of
anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, and homophobia), see RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8.
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structural injustice; it is, rather, the terms of principle that guarantees
both the legitimacy and integrity of the politics of identity so important
to advancing the understanding and remedy of structural injustice.
These concerns for the legitimacy and integrity of the politics of
identity may be most vivid for a pluralistic, largely immigrant culture
like that of the United States. Generations of Americans have
recurrently had to endure the ordeal of Americanization, encountering
nativist prejudice against their ethnic or racial group and determining
how, if at all, their identity as Americans would interact with their
identity as an African American or as an immigrant from Italy or
Eastern Europe, and the like. In a constitutional culture as rights-based
as the United States, Americans, whatever their ethnicity or race,
reasonably strive to be individuals, but individuals enriched by the
cultural depth of their diverse heritages or the struggle reasonably to
construct their heritages (as reflected, for example, in the development
of women's and gay studies92). A people, thus constituted, finds the
principle of free speech, as I have discussed it, the natural terms in
which a diverse and robust public culture will afford them both the
freedom and rationality critically to reflect on the values and dis-values
of their American and their ethnic and other identities and to weave
together a sufficiently complex tapestry adequate to express the
authentic moral identity of a free person. This is not the American
bleached WASP, but the American who weds convictions of universal
human rights to the cultural and human depth such rights, properly
understood, make possible.
The principle of free speech plays the role it has and does in a
reasonable politics of identity because of the normative links of its
principle to the underlying inalienable right to conscience as articulated
by the argument for toleration and the theory of structural injustice.
The cultural entrenchment of structural injustice crucially turns on both
the abridgment of the basic human right of conscience of a class of
persons and the irrationalist stereotypes that rationalize such
abridgment. The politics of identity, grounded in the right to free speech
commensurate with the underlying right to conscience, addresses both
wrongs: it demands the right and responsibility of protest, and it thus
reasonably criticizes the uncritical force dehumanizing stereotypes have
been unjustly allowed to enjoy. On the grounds of such protest, further
remedies for structural injustice are, of course, reasonable. Nothing in
92. See generally id. For an important development in the genre of gay studies, see JONATHAN
DOLLIMORE, SEXUAL DISSIDENCE: AUGUSTINE TO WILDE, FREUD TO FOUCAULT (1991).
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the argument proposed here debars such remedies in any way; indeed,
the role for free speech in the politics of identity, here defended,
clarifies both how and why such remedies should be pursued.
Such points may seem obvious, but they have not been to the
recent scholars who have urged rethinking the unconstitutionality of
group libel laws in order better to combat structural injustice. Such
scholars believe that such laws not only better combat racism and
related evils, but suggest that defense of such laws must itself exemplify
a refusal to take seriously reasonable remedies for structural injustice.93
One formulation of this objection even claims that, if group libel laws
are constitutionally suspect, so too must be judicial decisions and laws
that strike down racial segregation and anti-miscegenation laws and
other forms of racial discrimination. 94 Each claim requires careful
examination.
The first claim is asserted axiomatically: group libel laws must
remedy structural injustice in virtue of the content of group libels
expressing, for example, racial or religious hatred. The axiomatic force
of the claim dissolves, however, on analysis. First, the claim assumes a
competence in the state to identify transparently what counts as such a
libel in the domain of conscience, which is, as I have argued,
undefended and quite indefensible. Second, it assumes, from an already
controversial claim about what counts as group libel, that such claims, as
claims, inflict harm. But, this assumption conflates two questions that
the principle of free speech, rooted in the inalienable right to
conscience, correctly separates, namely, the content of conscientious
conviction and inflicting secular harms on persons. The state may, of
course, act to prevent the infliction of secular harms, but the principle of
free speech demands skepticism about state judgments about harms
inhering in convictions and speech expressing such convictions unless
and until there is a clear and present danger of such secular harms. As I
have elsewhere observed, 9 persons are not propositions or the
propositions they believe; it is a vicious political fallacy to assume that
our contempt for false evaluative convictions may justly be applied to
contempt for the persons who conscientiously hold and express such
views. Such persons are not, as if by definition, outside the civilizing
community of humane discourse. There is legitimate political power to
deal with those who move beyond conviction to overt acts which
93. For a compendium of such views, see WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 3.
94. See Lawrence, supra note 4, at 53-88.
95. See RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 192.
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threaten the rights of others. Not all those who entertain such
convictions do so, and many lacking such convictions will threaten such
acts. The principle of free speech insists that the offense taken at
convictions cannot be the measure of a clear and present danger
sufficient to justify the abridgment of speech.
It is revealing that sometimes this axiomatic claim is interpreted as
a way of squaring the principle of free speech of the First Amendment
with the guarantee of equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9 6
The idea appears to be that group libels instantiate the prejudices
condemned by equal protection and are thus overall (interpreting free
speech in light of equal protection) less worthy of constitutional
protection. The argument, of course, proves too much, encompassing
surely much conventional religious conviction that is at least sometimes
racist and quite often sexist and homophobic, let alone anti-Semitic. The
argument is no more plausible if further elaborated, as it sometimes is,97
in terms of the role such libels allegedly play in silencing dissent.
Allegation here masks not merely lack of evidence but our cumulative
historical experience to the contrary (the American principle of free
speech has advanced both the legitimacy and integrity of the politics of
identity; the experience of other nations with group libel laws, applied in
the United Kingdom, for example, to advocacy by black power leaders,
suggests such laws, if anything, delegitimate the politics of identity).98
Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment, properly understood, repeals
the principle of free speech based on the argument for toleration.
Indeed, the central principle of free speech requires, consistent with the
argument for toleration, an equal respect for all forms of conscience, an
equal protection in the domain of conscience further elaborated and
certainly not repealed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 The theory of structural injustice, which elaborates the
argument for toleration, best explains how they are related, 1°° defining
the role of free speech as a remedy for structural injustice.
Nothing in the argument for toleration or the theory of structural
96. See, e.g., FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 25-26.
97. See id.
98. On this point, see KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS,
COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 145 (1995); and Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX, supra note
5, at 181, 225-26. On the Canadian judicial treatment of such laws, see GREENAWALT, supra, at
64-70.
99. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
100. On this point, see RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8.
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injustice supports the claim that the unconstitutionality of group libel
laws also casts in doubt the judicial decisions and laws opposing
American apartheid. The theory of structural injustice brings the
argument for toleration to bear on the criticism of an unjust pattern of
cultural entrenchment, which, of course, includes abridgment of the
principle of free speech, but of much else besides. The proper
understanding of the remedy for such structural injustice includes, as I
have argued, a principle of free speech that extends to group libel laws,
but also the deconstruction of the practices (including racial segregation
and anti-miscegenation laws) that rationalized such structural injustice.
It was an important feature of the arguments of the politics of identity,
on the basis of the American principle of free speech, that such
rationalization importantly turned on cultural practices (like apartheid)
that masked structural injustice as facts of nature. Such practices were
certainly not understood as convictions or speech expressing such
convictions, though, like all practices, they were based on, indeed gave
expression to, convictions. To say that these practices are, on critical
examination, importantly cultural and are unjust (imposing harms on a
class of persons for inadequate reasons) is not to say that they are, as
group libel laws are, understood by both speakers and audiences to be
communicatively addressed to the domain of conscientious conviction.
Otherwise, the guarantees of free speech (extending to all convictions
whether true or false) would protect as well all policies based on such
convictions (whether just or unjust), which is absurd; in effect,
everything cultural becomes speech; a principle of free speech that thus
condemns everything is as vacuous as one that condemns nothing. The
principle of free speech addresses communications understood by
speakers and audiences to be addressed to the domain of conviction,
imposing a high burden of constitutional skepticism on state judgments
of the worth of convictions in this domain unless there is a clear and
present danger of secular harms. Nothing in the reasonable
understanding of the basis or scope of this skepticism extends to the
judicial decisions and policies attacking American apartheid, which
impose secular harms (depriving persons of basic human rights).
Rather, the principle of free speech, as I have defended its scope and
limits, has advanced understanding of the cultural entrenchment of such
structural injustice (the naturalization of injustice) and the
appropriateness of remedies therefore including the decisions and laws
invalidating the cultural practices of American apartheid.
The principle of free speech is consistent with a robust state power
to prevent secular harms, including the harms inflicted by violation of
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basic human rights. Structural injustice is such a harm. Its harms include
both the systematic abridgment of basic human rights to a class of
persons and the inadequate grounds of stereotypical dehumanization
that rationalize such abridgment. The state, itself complicitous with such
structural injustice, has both the legitimate power and responsibility to
take measures to remedy such harms. As I have argued, such measures
certainly include the constitutional invalidation of both race-based
segregation and anti-miscegenation laws, both of which importantly
constructed the stereotypical dehumanization in terms of which
abridgment of basic rights was rationalized.
Such remedies importantly included a public responsibility,
consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to advance basic education in democratic values like
toleration of minorities and antidiscrimination, including the forms of
desegregation mandates required by Brown v. Board of Education.101
Such mandates remedy the long American history of apartheid by
insisting that basic education no longer reflect and reinforce such racial
barriers but affirm a common education in values of mutual respect; in
this way, these mandates remedy one of the important ways in which
dehumanizing stereotypes of race were enforced as the unjust basis for
structural injustice. Other reasonable remedies include a curriculum
which educates in the values of equal respect, including some historical
sense of the American construction of structural injustice and the
struggles to overcome and correct it. Education of this sort must
include, to do justice to such struggles, a sense of the importance and
responsibilities of free speech, including, especially when students are
more mature, the values of academic freedom. A reasonable balance
must be struck between insisting on civility in discourse in academic
environments without compromising the important free speech values
of academic freedom, which are also part of the mission of liberal
education in a free society.102
Appropriate remedies, based on secular harms, also include the
passage and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws applicable both in
the public and private spheres. Discriminatory actions inflict the harm
of depriving people of their equal rights and opportunities on
inadequate grounds. The structural injustice, which underlies such
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. For criticism of some recent university speech codes for not striking a balance properly
sensitive to values of free speech, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL




harms, is enforced in part by the ways in which it privatizes injustice.
Accordingly, the laws forbidding the infliction of such harms must apply
both in the public and private sphere because this scope is alone
adequate to remedy the nature of the harm inflicted.
There is, further, no sound reason of moral or constitutional
principle why, where appropriate, affirmative action should not be an
appropriate remedy for the cultural entrenchment of structural
injustice. The principle underlying suspect classification analysis under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot
reasonably be interpreted in terms of an immutable and salient
characteristic, an interpretation that would render constitutionally
suspect any use of such a characteristic (including ameliorative
affirmative action plans).103 Rather, the principle of suspect classification
analysis condemns the expression through law of the dehumanizing
prejudices that rationalize structural injustice. 1°4 Affirmative action
programs do not violate this principle but better effectuate it when they
give appropriate weight to, for example, racial classifications as a
remedy for the force such prejudices have uncritically been permitted to
enjoy in limiting access to basic rights, opportunities, and resources. In
particular, such programs reasonably remedy the harms of such injustice
when they give appropriate weight to the unjust cultural force race has
been permitted to enjoy in framing remedies for structural injustice, for
example, race-sensitive opening of opportunities appropriately to rectify
a culture of racist exclusion and marginalization.
There is, finally, a compelling secular basis for the exercise of state
power aggressively to protect citizens from actions threatening the
rights of others (including inchoate crimes like conspiracy) motivated by
irrational hatred and prejudice, including forms of ad hominem racial
harassment.10 While groups that advocate racist dehumanization
cannot, consistent with free speech principles, be subjected to penalty
for such advocacy, there are often other acceptable grounds on which
they may be subject to law, including taking steps in concert, subject to
the law of conspiracy, to inflict harms on racial minorities. Thus, while
all Justices of the Supreme Court agreed on diverse grounds that a form
of group libel law could not constitutionally be enforced against a cross
burned on the lawn of a black family, they also conceded that such acts
103. For further discussion of this point, see RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 170-77.
104. For an extended defense of this view, see RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8.
105. For an illuminating study of these issues, see generally GREENAWALT, supra note 98.
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could have constitutionally been prosecuted on other grounds, including
terroristic threats, arson, and criminal damage to property.
10 6
The American constitutional objection to group libel laws is based
on their failure reasonably to meet the standards set by the argument of
principle that we call free speech. The unconstitutionality of group libel
and similar laws leaves open, indeed stimulates and encourages, both
the legitimacy and integrity of the politics of identity, for example, the
kind of rebuttal of racist and anti-Semitic speech so prominently part of
the American political landscape through the activities of such
organizations as the NAACP, the Anti-Defamation League, and many
others.
I recognize that there is venerable authority for not extending the
principle of toleration to the intolerant'0 7 and that the modernist
European nightmare of anti-Semitism'08 might be supposed to offer
continuing contemporary support for such a view at least in
circumstances comparable to those of Weimar Germany (in fact, the
Weimar democracy did not evenhandedly protect the free speech of the
right and the left and certainly did not use the legitimate powers it had
to protect rights at threat from racist injustices).19 Most contemporary
constitutional democracies, including Germany itself, understandably
take the view that the institutions of constitutionalism must self-
defensively protect themselves against the modernist demons of
populist racism by refusing such groups certain constitutional liberties.
On this view, limitations in free speech protection foster, against the
historical background of the powerful role of populist racist fascism in
European politics leading to World War II, a much needed public
education in constitutional values, making precisely the kind of
statement that must be made about the ultimate ethical values of
respect for the human dignity of all persons.
American free speech law undoubtedly has its grave critical
defects,110 but its view of group libel offers a plausible alternative
106. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 & n.1 (1992).
107. For useful discussion, see RAWLS, supra note 45, at 216-21.
108. See generally RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (rev. ed.
1985).
109. For useful discussion of those circumstances and their background, see JACOB KATZ,
FROM PREJUDICE TO DESTRUCTION: ANTI-SEMITISM, 1700-1933 (1980); and PETER PULZER, THE
RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA (1988).
110. The treatment by the United States Supreme Court of the relationship between free speech
and economic power is one of the areas of the gravest doubt both as a matter of sound interpretation
of American history and as an argument of democratic political theory. For an elaboration of this
view, see RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 215-19. In this
domain, the German constitutional theory of the duty to protect rights, including economic rights,
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interpretation of the principle of free speech to the common view
elsewhere about group libel. American interpretive experience suggests
that a sound argument of principle not only protects such anti-
constitutional speech (for the reasons already examined at length) but,
properly understood, renders such protection a more effective
instrument of ultimate public education in enduring constitutional
values, in particular, the place of the basic human rights of conscience
and speech in a free and democratic society of equal citizens. In
American circumstances, the principle of free speech-extended to
blatantly racist and anti-Semitic advocates like the KKKI'-has
remarkably energized and empowered the battle for racial justice and
religious toleration under the rule of law, a story ably told by Harry
Kalven in The Negro and the First Amendment.'12 An American
constitutionalist, like Kalven, would defend our position as a matter of
principle. "3 An argument of principle based on respect for conscience
must understand the moral ground on which it stands, one which
includes in its conception of what a community of principle is all persons
who conscientiously exercise their moral powers and who recognize
their ultimate responsibility to depend on themselves (not the state) to
exercise their moral powers in defense of rights. The principle of free
speech rests on the basic human right of each citizen, consistent with the
like equal right of all, to be the ultimate critic of the legitimacy of state
power. The principles of our tolerance are most in need when the
dissent is most radical, not when it is most conventional. Our
commitment to this kind of free testing of the legitimacy of our
institutions will be measured by the degree to which we extend our right
of free thought even to the radical dissent of moral barbarians who
would provoke us to their immorally exclusive measure of insularity,
parochialism, and faction. Our principles are, I believe, best and most
reasonably affirmed when we resist the temptation to respond to bigots
in kind and insist on embracing them in an inclusive moral community
that recognizes in all persons what some of them might willfully deny to
others, the equality of all persons as free and reasonable members of a
political community of principle. Protecting the rights of the speakers
may be a much better interpretation of the theory of constitutional legitimacy that both Germany
and the United States share. For a recent, often compelling critique of the Supreme Court's
treatment of campaign financing and related matters along these lines, see MARK A. GRABER,
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991).
111. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 359 U.S. 444 (1969); cf. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978) (American Nazi Party).
112. KALVEN, supra note 6.
113. See generally KALVEN, supra note 72.
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and speech we hate affirms the deeper fraternal bonds of a political
community based on universal human rights. In the case of the right of
free speech, the response, as a matter of principle, to hate should be, if
not the inhuman demands of universal love, at least the humane
demands of tolerance and mutual respect.
